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Abstract. In the course of the digitization in healthcare, the collection and 
central storage of large health-related datasets in clouds in the form of personal 
health records is growing. However, the use of cloud services for sensitive data 
is associated with security and privacy risks. Further, the delegation of control 
over security and privacy measures to the cloud provider requires trust on the 
users’ side. In order to investigate the role of security and privacy when storing 
and processing patient data, we conducted an online experiment, in which third-
party cloud services are compared to private on-premise data centers. 
Additionally, we examine the impact of data breaches on the perceived security, 
privacy, control and trust in both storage scenarios. Our results indicate that 
cloud-based personal health records still face concerns regarding perceived 
security, privacy, control and trust amongst end-users. Nevertheless, after a data 
breach, no significant differences between both solutions exist. 
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1 Introduction 
Personal health records (PHRs) can improve the collaboration between different 
healthcare actors and patients and ease the sharing of data [1] by providing central 
repositories of the users’ state of health [2]. When providing PHRs for patients, cloud 
computing (CC) offers numerous benefits, such as scalable computing resources at 
minimal costs [3]. Yet, adopting CC services for sensitive health data introduces risks 
associated to security and privacy, as the data are stored externally or even in public 
environments, which entails additional challenges, such as access control or privacy 
protection [4], [5]. Compared to private on-premise data storage, the control over the 
data and corresponding security and privacy measures is delegated to the cloud 
provider, which requires trust in the capabilities of the provider on the users’ side [4]. 
Since data security and privacy are crucial determinants for the adoption of PHRs [6], 
[7], it is necessary to evaluate whether patients’ data should be stored and processed 
on-premise or externally, via scalable CC services. For PHR providers, the users’ 
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acceptance, which is prerequisite for a sustainable adoption of the provided service, 
heavily depends on the selection of a secure and trustworthy storage solution [8]. 
Generally, data security and privacy issues are regarded as a central inhibitor for 
the adoption of cloud-based PHRs [5], [8]. For example, the cloud-based PHR app 
vivy, which was recently launched by several major German health insurances, faces 
massive criticism for data security and privacy issues, e.g., related to data hosting and 
processing at the underlying Amazon cloud platform [9]. Due to the high value and 
sensitivity of the data stored in PHRs, cloud environments are an attractive target of 
malicious attacks [5]. In case of a data breach, the security or privacy of the protected 
health data are compromised due to an impermissible use or disclosure [10]. The 
delegation of control in cloud environments [5], [11] and the corresponding need for 
trust [4] are connected to the perceived security and privacy of PHR users and in view 
of the theory of reasoned action [12], ultimately influencing the intention to use or 
adopt cloud-based PHRs [6]. Since CC faces skepticism [11], it is necessary to 
determine the importance of the factors that influence the intention to use cloud-based 
PHRs services to ensure their sustainable adoption. However, previous research either 
focuses on security or privacy related aspects [1], [5], [11], [13–15] or lacks a focus 
on either PHRs [11], [16] or CC [6], [7], [17]. Although data breaches continually 
impact the healthcare sector [5], [10], little research has been conducted on their 
outcome on users of cloud-based PHRs. Therefore, we adopt an experimental 
approach to investigate the participants’ perceived security, perceived privacy, trust, 
perceived control and intention to use when using a PHR of a provider who stores and 
processes personal health data (a) at a cloud provider or (b) an on-premise data center. 
Additionally, the impact of data breaches on the targeted constructs is investigated. 
We examine the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: Do patients’ perceived security, perceived privacy, trust and perceived 
control differ between cloud environments and private on-premise data centers 
when storing personal health data in PHRs? 
RQ2: In case of a data breach, to which extent do patients’ perceived security, 
perceived privacy, trust and perceived control differ when using cloud 
environments compared to private on-premise data centers? 
Based on the RQs, the study is structured as follows: First, hypotheses (H) targeting 
the above-mentioned constructs are derived from the literature. Second, the 
experimental approach and design are described. Afterwards, we analyze the collected 
data. In the conclusion, the findings are discussed. 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Data Security and Privacy  
Although CC plays a significant role in healthcare, the technology still faces data 
security and privacy concerns, especially in PHR provisioning [8], [14], [15], [17], 
[18]. As the two concepts are strongly connected, individuals often may not fully 
understand the difference between security of systems and privacy of their data [19], 
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[20]. Individuals choose to disclose information, although this might impact their 
privacy [21], which is decisively based on trust and the perception of risks related to 
data security and privacy. Yet, individuals may decide to refrain from disclosures that 
would affect the security of their data [19]. Therefore, it is necessary to examine both 
concepts individually [19], which is not always the case in existing literature on 
cloud-based PHRs [13], [14]. Although multiple definitions exist, we adapt the most 
common-sense understanding of privacy [22] as an individual’s ability to control the 
use of his or her own data [13], [20]. Besides perceived control [11], trust is a central 
determinant of users’ intention to disclose information [21]. Whereas privacy focuses 
on individuals’ control over their data, security is an overarching principle with focus 
on data confidentiality, integrity and availability [17]. Hence, in order to comply with 
privacy requirements, data security provides the technical foundations [18], [20].  
Since certain information stored in PHRs is shared with multiple actors, risks for 
data security and privacy arise [15], [17]. Consequently, the infrastructure via which 
PHRs are provided should be rigorously secured [8], [17]. However, this is a central 
challenge for cloud environments, especially for public clouds [4], [14], [18], where 
the probability of unauthorized access to data is significantly higher compared to 
traditional systems [23]. Therefore, data security is of great importance for the 
provision of PHRs via cloud environments [1]. Hence, on the side of PHR and cloud 
service providers, extensive data security and privacy requirements must be 
considered to guarantee an equal level of data security compared to on-premise data 
centers [8]. Thus, we hypothesize that users’ perceptions of security (SEC) and 
privacy (PRI) are more positive when PHRs are stored and processed on-premise, as 
using cloud services introduces additional risks and uncertainties [1], [4], [13], [24]: 
H1a/H2a: The users’ SEC/PRI is higher when their data are stored in on-premise 
data centers compared to cloud environments. 
Despite the sensitivity of PHR data, the risks associated to CC and the higher 
probability of data disclosures in cloud environments [23], the impact of actual data 
breaches on users’ SEC and PRI is only scarcely explored. If the security and privacy 
of users’ personal health data were compromised in a data breach, this will likely lead 
to increased perceived risks and an increased motivation for protection [19]. Due to 
the value and sensitivity of health data stored in PHRs, data breaches occur frequently 
[10] and potential consequences are severe [13], regardless of the underlying storage 
solution. From the service users’ perspective, the impact of and dealing with potential 
consequences are the same irrespective of whether a data breach occurred within a 
cloud or a conventional IT environment [23]. Thus, we hypothesize that the 
individuals’ levels of SEC and PRI do not differ after a data breach: 
H1b/H2b: After a data breach, the users’ SEC/PRI is equal regardless of whether 
the data are stored in on-premise data centers or cloud environments. 
2.2 Trust 
Trust (TR) is defined as the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a 
trustee, based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular action 
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relevant to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the trustee [25]. 
In the context of the acceptance of information systems, different trust targets exist, 
such as trust in a technology or a provider [26]. With regard to PHRs, the user takes 
the role of the trustor and the PHR provider the role of the trustee, who may utilize 
CC as underlying technology [24]. For the general adoption and use of cloud services, 
trust has been identified as a key factor [24], [27], as users delegate their control over 
data security and privacy to the provider, whose actions, in turn, are difficult to 
monitor [4]. In healthcare, users’ trust in security and privacy mechanisms of cloud 
providers is seen as a core determinant [8], [13]. The trustor must be confident that 
the cloud technology adopted in a certain healthcare data sharing scenario complies 
with security and privacy requirements [18]. Hence, when storing and processing 
personal health data in a PHR, we conclude that users’ trust in the PHR provider is 
lower when the data are stored in a cloud environment compared to on-premise data 
centers directly operated by the provider, since users perceive more risks associated to 
CC [11], [13], [16]. However, there should be no difference in the users’ trust after a 
data breach, as the perceived risks and the corresponding lower trust levels towards 
the technology are superposed by the decrease of trust in the PHR provider [26]: 
H3a: The users’ TR is higher when their data are stored in on-premise data 
centers compared to cloud environments. 
H3b: After a data breach, the users’ TR is equal regardless of whether the data 
are stored in on-premise data centers or cloud environments. 
Although most studies investigate the influence of perceived risks on trust [20], 
Mitchell (1999) identified that there is a bi-directional relationship between TR and 
perceived risks [28] that include SEC and PRI. This has, among others, been 
empirically proven by Hsin Chang and Wen Chen (2008) [29]. Regarding the 
acceptance of health clouds, trust in healthcare cloud providers and in privacy-
preserving mechanisms influence the patients’ information privacy concerns [13]. 
Thus, focusing on the role of security and privacy when storing personal health data 
in PHRs, we analyze the influence of TR on SEC and PRI: 
H4/H5: The higher the users’ TR, the higher the SEC/PRI. 
2.3 Control 
Another important aspect of privacy is the perceived control (CO) over a system or 
technology [30], which is largely determined by the extent to which a user is able to 
employ a system in order to achieve an intended goal [31]. In cloud environments, the 
users’ control over data and privacy or security measures is largely delegated to the 
cloud provider [11], [24]. In consequence, users perceive lower control over their 
data, which is why they connect CC with insecurities [11]. Thus, CO additionally 
refers to the extent to which users perceive that they have an impact on the control 
over their activities and data in the cloud service used [32]. Due to the sensitivity of 
data stored in a PHR, it is necessary that the users perceive to be in control and to be 
able to decide over the access to and the usage of their data. In this context, CO aims 
at both internal and external control. This means that the user feels capable of using 
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the system and further, that the situation allows this [33]. Compared to on-premise 
data centers, the provision of PHRs via cloud environments mainly differs in terms of 
external control, since CC is afflicted with uncertainties regarding the security and 
privacy of data [4], [24]. However, in case of a data breach occurring at either storage 
solution, we hypothesize that the awareness of uncertainties and risks connected to 
CC services only plays a minor role, as a loss of control over information is regarded 
as material for the perception of a privacy invasion [11]. Consequently, the CO for 
both PHR data storing and processing solutions adjusts to a comparably low level: 
H6a: The users’ CO is higher when their data are stored in on-premise data 
centers compared to cloud environments. 
H6b: After a data breach, the users’ CO is equal regardless of whether the data 
are stored in on-premise data centers or cloud environments. 
As trust is defined irrespectively of the ability to monitor or control the trustee [25], 
we do not assume a connection between CO and TR. Yet, SEC and PRI of PHRs are 
often linked to users’ CO, for example, by implementing access controls for PHRs 
[17] or health data in clouds in order to increase data security and privacy [15]. In 
cloud environments, recent studies suggest that cloud users’ CO majorly determines 
their PRI [11]. Hence, fostering users’ CO by means of security and privacy measures 
enhances the users’ SEC and PRI when storing and processing health data in PHRs: 
H7/H8: The higher the users’ CO, the higher the SEC/PRI. 
2.4 Intention to Use 
Following the theory of reasoned action, individuals’ intentional behaviors to adopt or 
use a system are ultimately determined by their attitudes [12], [34]. The intention to 
use (ITU) can be defined as the intention of a customer or service user to (continually) 
use a provider and his service (also after an incident) [24], [32]. Besides a general 
attitude towards a service, the ITU of a person is measured based on risks and benefits 
regarding a scenario or technology [13], [24]. Due to the steadily increasing 
complexity of technology, trust plays a crucial role in the acceptance of and the ITU 
information systems [26], such as cloud environments. In view of the impact of users’ 
security and privacy concerns towards CC, higher levels of security and privacy 
perceptions positively affect the ITU cloud services [16]. In this context, PRI and 
SEC are majorly determined by the delegation and the corresponding loss of control 
in cloud environments [11], [18], which ultimately affect the ITU cloud services [11]. 
In healthcare, control, trust, security and privacy are proven to influence the ITU 
cloud services, as end-users are not able to fully control the storage and processing of 
their data due to the control delegation and the opaque nature of cloud services [18], 
[24] as well as due to the sensitivity of data [13], [18]. Especially security and privacy 
are regarded as important requirements for the adoption of cloud-based PHRs [6], [8]. 
Further, trust is an antecedent of individuals’ disclosure behavior [21]. Thus, it is 
assumed that SEC, TR, CO and PRI have a positive impact on the ITU in PHR data 
sharing scenarios:  
H9/H10/H11/H12: The higher the users’ SEC/TR/CO/PRI, the higher the ITU. 
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2.5 Research Model 
The constructs and hypotheses are summarized in a research model (see Figure 1). 
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Privacy (PRI)
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H4
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H11
H12
H7
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Figure 1. Research Model 
3 Research Approach 
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
In order to test the previously developed hypotheses, we conducted a web-based 
experiment using vignettes [35]. Overall, we applied a two-group posttest-only design 
[36], which was extended by an additional stimulus (X2) and a second posttest (P2) in 
both groups to determine the impact of a data breach on the outlined constructs. The 
overall procedure of the experiment is visualized in Figure 2. 
1 P1X1R
2 P1R
Legend
1 P1X1R
1
Xj
Two-group Posttest-only Design 
with additional Event and Posttest
Randomized Treatment Group 
(Cloud Storage)
Stimuli(j): Cloud Storage(1) 
and Data Breach(2)
P PosttestQuestionnairesP2X2
P2X2
R
2 Randomized Control Group (On-Premise Storage)R
P2X2  
Figure 2. Experimental Setup 
The random allocation (R) of the participants to the two experiment groups G1 and 
G2 took place in an unnoticeable first step of the experiment. Afterwards, a vignette 
was displayed, which can be described as a focused description of a hypothetical 
scenario that puts the subjects in a fictitious role in which they are asked to respond in 
certain ways [35]. Our vignette1 introduced the participants to the German healthcare 
system, in which health-related data are stored decentrally. As a result, a medical 
treatment based on all existing health data is difficult, because stakeholders often 
cannot access all patient data. The participants are asked to act as longtime users of a 
service called Vitalife, which offers a PHR web service. The service provides a central 
storage and management of users’ relevant personal health and related data. The first 
                                                          
1 The full scenarios can be retrieved under the following link: http://bit.ly/WI-19 
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manipulation between group 1 (G1, treatment) and group 2 (G2, control) was 
conducted by using two data storage solutions of the PHR service provider Vitalife, 
i.e., a third-party cloud service (G1) (X1) and a private on-premise data center directly 
operated by Vitalife (G2). The participants of both groups were identically informed 
about data security and privacy measures of the respective systems in use. Both 
storage solutions comply with common information security standards, such as ISO 
27001, which require the development and implementation of a strict security 
program. Further, the third-party cloud service used by Vitalife complies with the 
cloud-related ISO 27017/27018 standards for IT security controls and the processing 
of personal data in cloud services. Both solutions offer an availability of 99.9 percent. 
After the vignette, the first posttest (P1) is conducted to measure the participants’ 
attitudes towards the different storage solutions prior to a data breach. In the 
subsequent textual description of the event [24], [27] (X2), the subjects are informed 
by Vitalife's customer service about a data breach at the employed cloud service 
provider (G1) or the on-premise data center (G2), in the course of which the PHR data 
of the participants were stolen. In both groups, an employee of Vitalife has been made 
responsible for the data breach, as he inadvertently opened a link in a phishing e-mail 
and thus enabled hackers to access the system. In order to allow for a comparison of 
the users’ SEC, PRI, CO and TR before and after the data breach, a second identical 
posttest (P2) was conducted directly after the event in both groups. In both tests, the 
participants were ultimately asked for their ITU the service based on their experience. 
3.2 Operationalization of the Constructs 
In the questionnaires, the subjects were surveyed regarding the outlined hypothetical 
constructs using several items derived from the literature (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Constructs and Item Sources 
Construct Adapted Definition Source 
SEC 
The perception of PHR service users regarding the capabilities of a 
provider to protect their data, which include safe transmission, 
prevention of unauthorized modification, access or interference. 
[20] 
PRI 
The PHR service users’ perceived ability to control the acquisition 
and use of their personal information [20], which includes the 
general concern of the provider, the adherence to privacy laws or 
the prevention of unauthorized information disclosure. 
[20] 
TR 
The willingness of a PHR service user to be vulnerable to the 
actions of a PHR service provider, based on the expectation that the 
provider safely stores and provides patients’ health data [25].  
[37] 
CO 
The extent to which PHR service users perceive that they can 
impact the storing and processing of their health data as well as the 
access rights of other stakeholders to their data. 
[31] 
ITU 
The intention to voluntarily use the provided PHR service, which 
stores health data in the cloud or in an on-premise data center. 
[13], 
[32] 
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All items were measured by means of a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(“strongly agree”) to 7 (“strongly disagree”). For SEC and PRI, 6 items each from 
Flavián and Guinalíu (2006) [20] were used. TR was measured based on 11 items 
from McKnight et al. (2002) [37], with 4 items targeting the integrity (TRI) and 
ability (TRA) each as well as 3 items measuring the benevolence (TRB) of Vitalife. 
For CO, 4 items of Lee and Benbasat (2011) [31] were used. ITU was measured with 
3 items adapted from Ermakova (2014) [13] and one from Walter et. al (2014) [32]. 
3.3 Participants and Data Collection 
To test our proposed hypotheses, the previously described experimental concept was 
carried out as a web-based survey in February 2018. In total, 238 undergraduate 
economics and information systems students participated in the voluntary experiment, 
which was rewarded with minor raffled incentives. Out of the 238 answers, we only 
considered complete datasets for the analysis and eliminated answers with response 
patterns or significantly faster overall response times. Among the remaining 217 
datasets, 104 participants belong to group 1 and 113 to group 2, with an overall of 
35 % female and 65 % male participants and an average age of 20.6 years. 
4 Data Analysis and Results 
4.1 Construct Validity and Reliability 
In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the collected data, several tests were 
conducted. The analysis of variances tests (ANOVA), Levene tests of variance 
equality and t-tests for the control variables gender, age, health condition and CC 
experience did not indicate significant differences between the groups (N = 217). 
Therefore, a homogeneous distribution of the participants can be assumed. Given a 
mean self-estimation of 3.37, it can be concluded that the participants are fairly 
knowledgeable in CC. Since most of the hypotheses and the research model are based 
on the first posttest, the validity and reliability are assessed based on the 
corresponding data and are thus concluded for the second posttest. The data were 
examined in order to preclude a common method bias (CMB) using Harman’s one-
factor test [38]. The 30 indicators used were examined in a factor analysis. Since the 
resulting extraction of one factor explaining 45.783% of the variance is below the 
threshold of 50%, we do not assume a CMB [38]. Subsequently, we assessed the one-
dimensionality of the constructs in an exploratory factor analysis. All indicators meet 
the respective thresholds for Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) (> .5), the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-criterion (KMO) (> .5), communalities (> .5) and the Bartlett-
test (< .05) [39], except from the items TRB2 and TRB3 with communalities < .5 
(.450 and .498). Hence, both items were dropped from further analyses, which, using 
reflective measurement, does not affect the meaning of a construct [39], [40]. Further, 
according to Kaiser’s rule, five common factors with an eigenvalue of > 1, which 
explain 66.915% of the variance, could be extracted. This confirms our predetermined 
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five constructs SEC, PRI, CO, TR and ITU [39]. Although items with loadings > .6 
are considered as reliable [41], we dropped all items with loadings < .7 in order to 
achieve better construct validity, as suggested by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) [42]. 
This concerns our items TRA1 (.699), TRA4 (.576), PRI4 (.698) and SEC2 (.680). 
Further, since the cross loadings of the items PRI5 (.697 to TR), TRI1, TRI3 and 
TRI4 (.643, .657 and .692 to PRI) are relatively high, the respective items were 
dropped in order to strengthen discriminant validity, which did not adversely affect 
our previously conducted analyses. 
The construct’s internal consistency reliability was assessed calculating the 
Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), the inter-item correlation (IIC) and the corrected inter-scale 
correlation (CISC). For CA, IIC and CISC, the recommended threshold values (CA 
≥ .7; IIC ≥ .3; CISC ≥ .5) are met for all constructs (see Table 2). The reliability of the 
constructs in terms of quality criteria of second order was assessed examining the 
composite reliability (CR) and the average variances extracted (AVE) (see Table 2). 
For both measures, the thresholds are met (CR ≥ .6; AVE ≥ .5). Regarding the 
indicator reliability (IR) (not listed in Table 2), the required threshold of ≥ .4 is met 
by all indicators (lowest IR = .545). Therefore, we assume convergent validity in the 
context of construct validity. Next, we evaluated the discriminant validity by checking 
for the Fornell-Larcker criterion, which states that the square roots of the AVE (dark 
cells) need to be higher than the corresponding correlations between the constructs 
[43]. Since this is the case for all our constructs, discriminant validity for all factors 
can be assumed. Thus, our constructs serve for further hypotheses testing. 
Table 2. Discriminant Validity 
Factor # Items CISC IIC CA CR AVE CO ITU PRI SEC TR 
CO 3 .754-.829 .752 .901 .938 .835 .914     
ITU 4 .701-.856 .708 .906 .934 .781 .578 .884    
PRI 4 .623-.683 .539 .824 .883 .653 .629 .629 .808   
SEC 5 .682-.830 .680 .914 .936 .746 .592 .607 .640 .863  
TR 4 .527-.654 .486 .791 .865 .616 .555 .580 .681 .577 .785 
4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
To examine the influence of the experiment conditions on the latent variables TR, CO 
as well as on SEC and PRI, we conducted analyses of means (two-sample t-test). To 
evaluate the differences between the constructs regarding cloud service (G1) and on-
premise data storage (G2) before (“a” hypotheses, G1 and G2) and after a data breach 
(“b” hypotheses, G1E and G2E), the results of the first and the second posttest were 
compared between G1 and G2 (see Table 3). As the Levene tests are not significant, 
we assume variance homogeneity for all constructs. Since significant differences for 
all constructs between G1 and G2 (p < .05) were identified, H1a, H2a, H3a and H6a 
are supported. Regarding the outcome of the event on the hypotheses, no significant 
differences can be identified for SEC, PRI and TR except for CO (p = .026). Hence, 
except from H6b, we find support for H1b, H2b and H3b. 
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Table 3. Significance Levels and Mean Values 
Construct Result G1 and G2 G1E and G2E 
SEC 
Mean Value G1; G2 3.217; .2.890 4.931; 4.850 
Sig. t-Test (Levene) .038 (.116) .617 (.206) 
PRI 
Mean Value G1; G2 2.623; 2.352 3.421; 3.188 
Sig. t-Test (Levene) .033 (.735) .091 (.055) 
TR 
Mean Value G1; G2 2.618; 2.316 3.447; 3.232 
Sig. t-Test (Levene) .003 (.958) .114 (.108) 
CO 
Mean Value G1; G2 2.798; 2.443 3.683; 3.295 
Sig. t-Test (Levene) .029 (.506) .026 (.388) 
The relationships between the constructs and their impact on the dependent variables 
were evaluated using partial least squares (PLS) structural equation modeling (SEM) 
with SmartPLS 3.0 [44]. In order to evaluate the model fit, we checked for the 
CMIN/DF as well as the SRMR of the model (2.661, .073), which meet the required 
thresholds (CMIN/DF ≤ 3.0, SRMR ≤ .08) [45], [46]. Since further fitness criteria 
range slightly above or below the recommended thresholds (in brackets), i.e., CFI = 
.909 (≥ .9), RMSEA = .088 (≤ .08, should not exceed ≥ .1) and GFI = .837 (≥ .9), we 
assume a good model fit. Especially RMSEA values are debatable and thus drawing 
absolute cutoffs is inadvisable [41], particularly when considering smaller sample 
sizes with n ≤ 250 [46]. Afterwards, the path correlations of our SEM were evaluated 
in order to identify significant correlations between the constructs (see Figure 3). 
Perceived Privacy 
(PRI)
corr. R2 = .434
Perceived Security 
(SEC)
corr. R2 = .551
Trust 
(TR)
Intention to Use 
(ITU)
corr. R2 = .497
Perceived Control 
(CO)
.175*
.236**
.244**
.188*
.479***
.393***
.359***
.363***
*** p-value < .050
*** p-value < .010
*** p-value < .001  
Figure 3. PLS Model 
Strong statistically significant relationships between TR and SEC and PRI as well as 
between CO and SEC and PRI can be confirmed. Hence, we find support for H4, H5, 
H7 and H8 in our model. Further, path coefficients of ≥ .236 between SEC as well as 
PRI and ITU point to a moderate influence of both constructs on ITU. Therefore, H9 
and H10 can be confirmed. Since CO and TR largely determine SEC and PRI (R² = 
.551 and .434), which again have a strong effect on the ITU and despite the relatively 
low but still significant (p < .05) path correlations (.175 and .188), we assume a low 
but significant impact of TR and CO on ITU. Thus, H10 and H11 can be confirmed. 
Based on the analyses, the statuses of our hypotheses are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Statuses of the Hypotheses 
H Relation Status  H Relation Status 
1a SEC(G2) > SEC(G1) Supported  6a CO(G2) > CO(G1) Supported 
1b SEC(G2E) = SEC(G1E) Supported  6b CO(G2E) = CO(G1E) Not Supported 
2a PRI(G2) > PRI(G1) Supported  7 CO ↑ ⇒ SEC ↑ Supported 
2b PRI(G2E) = PRI(G1E) Supported  8 CO ↑ ⇒ PRI ↑ Supported 
3a TR(G2) > TR(G1) Supported  9 SEC ↑ ⇒ ITU ↑ Supported 
3b TR(G2E) = TR(G1E) Supported  10 TR ↑ ⇒ ITU ↑ Supported 
4 TR ↑ ⇒ SEC ↑ Supported  11 CO ↑ ⇒ ITU ↑ Supported 
5 TR ↑ ⇒ PRI ↑ Supported  12 PRI ↑ ⇒ ITU ↑ Supported 
5 Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion and Implications 
The results of the structural equation model indicate that TR, CO, SEC and PRI are 
key determinants of the intention to use PHR services. In addition, TR and CO both 
significantly determine SEC and PRI (H4, H5, H7, H8), which ultimately determine 
the ITU the provided service, independently of the underlying storage solution (cloud 
vs. on-premise) (H9, H10, H11, H12). Given the similar outcome of both - the storage 
solution and the data breach - on SEC and PRI, it is possible that the participants did 
not significantly differentiate between the constructs [19]. Thus, apart from the 
necessity to comply with strict healthcare regulations, PHR providers need to consider 
measures that strengthen the TR, CO and especially the SEC and PRI of potential 
users, e.g., by providing transparency over control, security and privacy measures. 
Although previous research found that the positive aspects of health clouds outweigh 
patients’ privacy concerns [13], the results of the experiment reveal that the subjects’ 
SEC, PRI, CO and TR are significantly higher when personal data in the form of 
PHRs are stored on-premise compared to cloud environments (H1a, H2a, H3a, H6a) 
(RQ1). Thus, despite the relatively high maturity of the technology and the efforts 
undertaken by theory and practice, CC still faces skepticism regarding the 
provisioning of PHRs. Providers of PHR solutions need to be aware of this perception 
and have to decide whether to offer their services via cloud environments or on-
premise solutions. When offering cloud-based PHR services, providers might rely on 
private clouds in order to minimize concerns on the users’ side. Further, hybrid cloud 
infrastructures can be used for encrypted or non-sensitive data in order to realize 
cloud-related benefits. However, in case of a data breach, no significant differences 
regarding SEC, PRI and TR between the two solutions could be determined (H1b, 
H2b, H3b), except for CO (H6b) (RQ2). In cloud environments, data breaches might 
entail a considerably larger impact on the side of the provider compared to on-premise 
environments [23]. Hence, cloud services need to emphasize their measures regarding 
security and privacy and foster the trust of (potential) end-users, e.g., by providing 
certifications [8], as cloud users seek for external control agents [11]. In order to 
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avoid severe consequences for PHR service users in case of a data breach, strong 
encryption mechanisms should be implemented [1], [15]. Although both storage 
solutions were compliant to ISO27001, the SEC, PRI and TR in the cloud scenario 
were found to be lower. Thus, besides providing certifications, further measures are 
necessary in order to foster users’ perceptions of the constructs. In addition, the 
experiment revealed that the participants’ CO regarding the on-premise solution is 
still significantly higher after a data breach, even though the participants’ abilities 
regarding control did not vary between the experiment groups. This is presumed to be 
ascribed to the control delegation and the associated reservations towards cloud 
environments, which draws the attention of cloud-based PHR providers on 
establishing measures to particularly foster their users’ CO. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Since the applied vignette technique puts the participants in a fictitious scenario, the 
behavior of the subjects might be different compared to a real-world scenario [35]. In 
addition, using students as experiment participants is not without controversy in the 
field of information systems and partially limits the generalizability of the results. 
However, since students reflect the future target group and are early adopters of 
innovative technologies, such as CC and PHRs, we argue that students are an 
adequate sample group for the experiment conducted [24], [32]. In this context, it is 
necessary to note that the experiment was conducted based on a relatively 
homogeneous sample group, which might influence the overall results. Concerning 
the evaluation of the model fit, our research model revealed slight weaknesses in 
terms of some fit indices. Nevertheless, since the deviations from the recommended 
thresholds are relatively small and cutoff thresholds are discussed controversially 
[41], we argue that the overall model is not endangered. Further, although established 
items for measuring trust were derived from the literature [37], several items had to be 
dropped. Yet, since we used reflective measurement, the meaning of the constructs 
TR, PRI and SEC was not affected [39], [40]. However, using constructs which 
strongly differ in the number of items (e.g., TR and ITU) might lead to distorted 
results. In addition, due to the temporal proximity of the two posttests conducted, an 
impact of the first on the second survey resulting in a certain bias is possible.  
Regarding the data breach, the manipulation of the subjects can possibly be 
ascribed to multiple factors. In G1, the data are stored externally at a cloud provider, 
whereas in G2, the data are stored on-premise, which might lead to different 
accusations towards the actors. However, the examined scenarios reflect the practical 
problem of companies whether to provide their services via external cloud solutions 
or on-premise data centers [8], [17]. In this context, it needs to be noted that the use of 
certain PHR systems might not be purely voluntarily, but instead stipulated by politics 
or certain healthcare actors. Although control is seen as a core principle of privacy 
[30], the adoption of privacy as control in the course of this study can be regarded as 
simplification of the complex nature of the construct [22], [30]. As we concentrated 
on trust and control as influencing factors of SEC and PRI, the examination of further 
constructs or the application of behavioral explanation models is possible. 
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Our study provides multiple starting points for future work. For example, besides 
investigating TR and CO as influencing factors of PRI and SEC, further constructs 
(e.g., benefits) can be examined regarding their influence on the two constructs. 
Additionally, the cause for the higher perceived control in the on-premise solution 
after a data breach and the correspondingly adjusted levels of SEC, PRI and TR allow 
for further investigation. A practical validation of the results by means of an 
examination of a commercial PHR provider, e.g., in the form of a case study, is 
desirable. In this context, the implications and results from the present study may 
serve as a foundation for additional qualitative studies or the examination of actual 
privacy behaviors. Moreover, our experimental setup even allows for richer insights 
and analyses, e.g., a cross-comparison between the groups before and after the breach. 
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